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Abstrat
This paper onsiders the minimization of transmit power in Gaussian parallel interferene hannels,
subjet to a rate onstraint for eah user. To derive deentralized solutions that do not require
any ooperation among the users, we formulate this power ontrol problem as a (generalized) Nash
equilibrium game. We obtain suient onditions that guarantee the existene and nonemptiness
of the solution set to our problem. Then, to ompute the solutions of the game, we propose two
distributed algorithms based on the single user waterlling solution: The sequential and the simul-
taneous iterative waterlling algorithms, wherein the users update their own strategies sequentially
and simultaneously, respetively. We derive a unied set of suient onditions that guarantee the
uniqueness of the solution and global onvergene of both algorithms. Our results are appliable
to all pratial distributed multipoint-to-multipoint interferene systems, either wired or wireless,
where a quality of servie in terms of information rate must be guaranteed for eah link.
Index Terms: Gaussian parallel interferene hannel, mutual information, game theory, general-
ized Nash equilibrium, spetrum sharing, iterative waterlling algorithm.
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1 Introdution and Motivation
The interferene hannel is a mathematial model relevant to many ommuniation systems where
multiple unordinated links share a ommon ommuniation medium, suh as wireless ad-ho networks
or Digital Subsriber Lines (DSL). In this paper, we fous on the Gaussian parallel interferene hannel.
A pragmati approah that leads to an ahievable region or inner bound of the apaity region
is to restrit the system to operate as a set of independent units, i.e., not allowing multiuser enod-
ing/deoding or the use of interferene anelation tehniques. This ahievable region is very relevant
in pratial systems with limitations on the deoder omplexity and simpliity of the system. With
this assumption, multiuser interferene is treated as noise and the transmission strategy for eah user is
simply his power alloation. The system design redues then to nding the optimum power distribution
for eah user over the parallel hannels, aording to a speied performane metri.
Within this ontext, existing works [1℄-[13℄ onsidered the maximization of the information rates
of all the links, subjet to transmit power and (possibly) mask onstraints on eah link. In [1℄-[3℄,
a entralized approah based on duality theory [14, 15℄ was proposed to ompute, under tehnial
onditions, the largest ahievable rate region of the system (i.e., the Pareto-optimal set of the ahievable
rates). In [4℄, suient onditions for the optimal spetrum sharing strategy maximizing the sum-rate
to be frequeny division multiple aess (FDMA) were derived. However, the algorithms proposed
in [1℄-[4℄ are omputationally expensive and annot be implemented in a distributed way, require the
full-knowledge of the system parameters, and are not guaranteed to onverge to the global optimal
solution.
Therefore, in [5℄-[13℄, using a game-theory framework, the authors foused on distributed algorithms
with no entralized ontrol. In partiular, the rate maximization problem was formulated as a strategi
non-ooperative game, where every link is a player that ompetes against the others by hoosing the
transmission strategy that maximizes its own information rate [5℄. Based on the elebrated notion
of Nash Equilibrium (NE) in game theory [16℄, an equilibrium for the whole system is reahed when
every player's reation is unilaterally optimal, i.e., when, given the rival players' urrent strategies,
any hange in a player's own strategy would result in a rate loss. In [6℄-[13℄, alternative suient
onditions were derived that guarantee the uniqueness of the NE of the rate maximization game and
the onvergene of alternative distributed waterlling based algorithms, either synhronous − sequential
[6℄-[11℄ and simultaneous [12℄ − or asynhronous [13℄.
The game theoretial formulation proposed in the ited papers, is a useful approah to devise totally
distributed algorithms. However, due to possible asymmetries of the system and the inherent selsh
nature of the optimization, the Nash equilibria of the rate maximization game in [5℄-[13℄ may lead
to ineient and unfair rate distributions among the links even when the game admits a unique NE.
This unfairness is due to the fat that, without any additional onstraint, the optimal power alloation
2
orresponding to a NE of the rate maximization game is often the one that assigns high rates to the
users with the highest (equivalent) hannels; whih strongly penalizes all the other users. As many
realisti ommuniation systems require presribed Quality of Servie (QoS) guarantees in terms of
ahievable rate for eah user, the system design based on the game theoreti formulation of the rate
maximization might not be adequate.
To overome this problem, in this paper we introdue a new distributed system design, that takes ex-
pliitly into aount the rate onstraints. More speially, we propose a novel strategi non-ooperative
game, where every link is a player that ompetes against the others by hoosing the power alloation
over the parallel hannels that attains the desired information rate, with the minimum transmit power.
We will refer to this new game as power minimization game. An equilibrium is ahieved when every
user realizes that, given the urrent power alloation of the others, any hange in its own strategy
would result in an inrease in transmit power. This equilibrium is referred to as Generalized Nash
Equilibrium (GNE) and the orresponding game is alled Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem.
1
The game theoretial formulation proposed in this paper diers signiantly from the rate maxi-
mization games studied in [5℄-[13℄. In fat, dierently from these referenes, where the users are allowed
to hoose their own strategies independently from eah other, in the power minimization game, the
rate onstraints indue a oupling among the players' admissible strategies, i.e., eah player's strategy
set depends on the urrent strategies of all the other players. This oupling makes the study of the
proposed game muh harder than that of the rate maximization game and no previous result in [5℄-[13℄
an be used. Reently, the alulation of generalized Nash equilibria has been the subjet of a renewed
attention also in the mathematial programming ommunity, see for example [17℄-[21℄. Nevertheless,
in spite of several interesting advanes [21℄, none of the game results in the literature are appliable to
the power minimization game.
The main ontributions of the paper are the following. We provide suient onditions for the
nonemptiness and boundedness of the solution set of the generalized Nash problem. Interestingly,
these suient onditions suggest a simple admission ontrol proedure to guarantee the feasibility
of a given rate prole of the users. Indeed, our existene proof uses an advaned degree-theoreti
result for a nonlinear omplementarity problem in order to handle the unboundedness of the users'
rate onstraints. We also derive onditions for the uniqueness of the GNE. Interestingly, our suient
onditions beome also neessary in the ase of one subhannel. To ompute the generalized Nash
solutions, we propose two alternative totally distributed algorithms based on the single user waterlling
solution: The sequential IWFA and the simultaneous IWFA. The sequential IWFA is an instane of the
Gauss-Seidel sheme: The users update their own strategy sequentially, one after the other, aording
1
Aording to reent use, we term generalized Nash equilibrium problem a Nash game where the feasible sets of the
players depend on the other players' strategy. Suh kind of games have been alled in various dierent ways in the
literature, for example soial equilibrium problems or just Nash equilibrium problems.
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to the single user waterlling solution and treating the interferene generated by the others as additive
noise. The simultaneous IWFA is based on the Jaobi sheme: The users hoose their own power
alloation simultaneously, still using the single user waterlling solution. Interestingly, even though the
rate onstraints indue a oupling among the feasible strategies of all the users, both algorithms are still
totally distributed. In fat, eah user, to ompute the waterlling solution, only needs to measure the
power of the noise plus the interferene generated by the other users over eah subhannel. It turns out
that the onditions for the uniqueness of the GNE are suient for the onvergene of both algorithms.
Our onvergene analysis is based on a nonlinear transformation that turns the generalized game in
the power variables into a standard game in the rate variables. Overall, this paper oers two major
ontributions to the literature of game-theoreti approahes to multiuser ommuniation systems: (i)
a new nonooperative game model is introdued for the rst time that diretly addresses the issue of
QoS in suh systems, and (ii) a new line of analysis is introdued in the literature of distributed power
alloation that is expeted to be broadly appliable for other game models.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 gives the system model and formulates the power
minimization problem as a strategi non-ooperative game. Setion 3 provides the suient onditions
for the existene and uniqueness of a GNE of the power minimization game. Setion 4 ontains the
desription of the distributed algorithms along with their onvergene onditions. Finally, Setion 5
draws the onlusions. Proofs of the results are given in the Appendies AF.
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this setion we larify the assumptions and the onstraints underlying the system model and we
formulate the optimization problem expliitly.
2.1 System model
We onsider a Q-user Gaussian N -parallel interferene hannel. In this model, there are Q transmitter-
reeiver pairs, where eah transmitter wants to ommuniate with its orresponding reeiver over a
set of N parallel subhannels. These subhannels an model either frequeny-seletive or at-fading
time-seletive hannels [9℄. Sine our goal is to nd distributed algorithms that do not require neither
a entralized ontrol nor a oordination among the links, we fous on transmission tehniques where no
interferene anelation is performed and multiuser interferene is treated as additive olored noise from
eah reeiver. Moreover, we assume perfet hannel state information at both transmitter and reeiver
side of eah link;
2
eah reeiver is also assumed to measure with no errors the power of the noise plus
the overall interferene generated by the other users over the N subhannels. For eah transmitter q,
2
Note that eah user is only required to known its own hannel, but not the hannels of the other users.
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the total average transmit power over the N subhannels is (in units of energy per transmitted symbol)
Pq =
1
N
N∑
k=1
pq(k), (1)
where pq(k) denotes the power alloated by user q over the subhannel k.
Under these assumptions, invoking the apaity expression for the single user Gaussian hannel −
ahievable using random Gaussian odes from all the users − the maximum information rate on link q
for a spei power alloation is [23℄
3
Rq(pq,p−q) =
N∑
k=1
log (1 + sinrq(k)) , (2)
with sinrq(k) denoting the Signal-to-Interferene plus Noise Ratio (SINR) of link q on the k-th sub-
hannel:
sinrq(k) ,
|Hqq(k)|
2 pq(k)
σ2
q
(k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k)
, (3)
where |Hqr(k)|
2
is the power gain of the hannel between destination q and soure r; σ2
q
(k) is the
variane of Gaussian zero mean noise on subhannel k of reeiver q; and pq , (pq(k))
N
k=1 is the power
alloation strategy of user q aross the N subhannel, whereas p−q , (pr)r 6=q ontains the strategies
of all the other users.
2.2 Game theoreti formulation
We formulate the system design within the framework of game theory [25, 26℄, using as desirability
riterion the onept of GNE, see for example [16, 27℄. Speially, we onsider a strategi non-
ooperative game, in whih the players are the links and the payo funtions are the transmit powers
of the users: Eah player ompetes against the others by hoosing the power alloation (i.e., its strategy)
that minimizes its own transmit power, given a onstraint on the minimum ahievable information rate
on the link. A GNE of the game is reahed when eah user, given the strategy prole of the others, does
not get any power derease by unilaterally hanging its own strategy, still keeping the rate onstraint
satised. Stated in mathematial terms, the game has the following struture:
G =
{
Ω, {Pq(p−q)}q∈Ω , {Pq}q∈Ω
}
, (4)
where Ω , {1, 2, . . . , Q} denotes the set of the ative links, Pq(p−q) ⊆ R
N
+ is the set of admissible
power alloation strategies pq ∈ Pq(p−q) of user q over the subhannels N , {1, . . . , N}, dened as
Pq(p−q) ,
{
xq∈ R
N
+ : Rq(xq,p−q) ≥ R
⋆
q
}
. (5)
3
Observe that a GNE is obtained if eah user transmits using Gaussian signaling, with a proper power alloation.
However, generalized Nash equilibria ahievable using non-Gaussian odes may exist. In this paper, we fous only on
transmissions using Gaussian odebooks.
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with Rq(pq,p−q) given in (2), and R
⋆
q denotes the minimum transmission rate required by eah user,
whih we assume positive without loss of generality. In the sequel we will make referene to the vetor
R⋆ , (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 as to the rate prole. The payo funtion of the q-th player is its own transmit power
Pq, given in (1). Observe that, beause of the rate onstraints, the set of feasible strategies Pq(p−q)
of eah player q depends on the power alloations p−q of all the other users.
The optimal strategy for the q-th player, given the power alloation of the others, is then the
solution to the following minimization problem
minimize
pq
N∑
k=1
pq(k)
subject to pq ∈ Pq(p−q)
, (6)
where Pq(p−q) is given in (5). Note that, for eah q, the minimum in (6) is taken over pq, for a xed
but arbitrary p−q. Interestingly, given p−q, the solution of (6) an be obtained in losed form via
the solution of a singly-onstrained optimization problem; see [28℄ for an algorithm to implement this
solution in pratie.
Lemma 1 For any xed and nonnegative p−q, the optimal solution p
⋆
q = {p
⋆
q(k)}
N
k=1 of the optimization
problem (6) exists and is unique. Furthermore,
p⋆q = WFq (p1, . . . ,pq−1,pq+1, . . . ,pQ) = WFq(p−q) , (7)
where the waterlling operator WFq (·) is dened as
[WFq (p−q)]k ,
λq − σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k)
|Hqq(k)|
2
+ , k ∈ N , (8)
with (x)+ , max(0, x) and the water-level λq hosen to satisfy the rate onstraint Rq(p
⋆
q ,p−q) = R
⋆
q ,
with Rq(pq,p−q) given in (2).
The solutions of the game G in (4), if they exist, are the Generalized Nash Equilibria, formally
dened as follows.
Denition 2 A feasible strategy prole p⋆ = (p⋆q)
Q
q=1 is a GNE of the game G if
N∑
k=1
p⋆q(k) ≤
N∑
k=1
pq(k), ∀pq ∈ Pq(p
⋆
−q), ∀q ∈ Ω. (9)
Aording to Lemma 1, all the Generalized Nash Equilibria of the game must satisfy the ondition
expressed by the following Corollary.
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Corollary 3 A feasible strategy prole p⋆ = (p⋆q)
Q
q=1 is a GNE of the game G if and only if it satises
the following system of nonlinear equations
p⋆q = WFq
(
p⋆1, . . . ,p
⋆
q−1,p
⋆
q+1, . . . ,p
⋆
Q
)
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (10)
with WFq (·) dened in (8).
Given the nonlinear system of equations (10), the fundamental questions we want an answer to are:
i) Does a solution exist, for any given users' rate prole? ii) If a solution exists, is it unique? iii) How
an suh a solution be reahed in a totally distributed way?
An answer to the above questions is given in the forthoming setions.
3 Existene and Uniqueness of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium
In this setion we rst provide suient onditions for the existene of a nonempty and bounded
solution set of the Nash equilibrium problem (4). Then, we fous on the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
3.1 Existene of a generalized Nash equilibrium
Given the rate prole R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1, dene, for eah k ∈ N , the matrix Zk(R
⋆) ∈ RQ×Q as
Zk(R
⋆) ,

|H11(k)|
2 −(eR
⋆
1 − 1) |H12(k)|
2 · · · −(eR
⋆
1 − 1) |H1Q(k)|
2
−(eR
⋆
2 − 1) |H21(k)|
2 |H22(k)|
2 · · · −(eR
⋆
2 − 1) |H2Q(k)|
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−(eR
⋆
Q − 1) |HQ1(k)|
2 −(eR
⋆
Q − 1) |HQ2(k)|
2 · · · |HQQ(k)|
2

. (11)
We also need the denition of P-matrix, as given next.
Denition 4 A matrix A ∈ RN×N is alled Z-matrix if its o-diagonal entries are all non- positive.
A matrix A ∈ RN×N is alled P-matrix if every prinipal minor of A is positive.
Many equivalent haraterizations for a P-matrix an be given. The interested reader is referred to
[31, 32℄ for more details. Here we note only that any positive denite matrix is a P-matrix, but the
reverse does not hold.
Suient onditions for the nonemptiness of a bounded solution set for the game G are given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 5 The game G with rate prole R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 > 0 admits a nonempty and bounded solution
set if Zk(R
⋆) is a P-matrix, for all k ∈ N , with Zk(R
⋆) dened in (11). Moreover, any GNE p⋆ =
7
(p∗q)
Q
q=1 is suh that
p∗1(k)
.
.
.
p∗Q(k)
 ≤

p1(k)
.
.
.
pQ(k)
 , (Zk(R⋆) )−1

σ21(k) ( e
R⋆1 − 1 )
.
.
.
σ2Q(k) ( e
R⋆Q − 1 )
 , k ∈ N . (12)
Proof. See Appendix A.
A more general (but less easy to hek) result on the existene of a bounded solution set for the
game G is given by Theorem 23 in Appendix A.
We now provide alternative suient onditions for Theorem 5 in terms of a single matrix. To this
end, we rst introdue the following matrix
Zmax(R⋆) ,

1 −(eR
⋆
1 − 1)βmax12 · · · −(e
R⋆
1 − 1)βmax1Q
−(eR
⋆
2 − 1)βmax21 1 · · · −(e
R⋆
2 − 1)βmax2Q
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−(eR
⋆
Q − 1)βmaxQ1 −(e
R⋆
Q − 1)βmaxQ2 · · · 1

, (13)
where
βmaxqr , max
k∈N
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hrr(k)|
2 , ∀r 6= q , q ∈ Ω. (14)
We also denote by eR
⋆
−1 the Q-vetor with q-th omponent eR
⋆
q − 1, for q = 1, . . . , Q. Then, we have
the following orollary.
Corollary 6 If Zmax(R⋆) in (13) is a P-matrix, then all the matries {Zk(R
⋆)} dened in (11) are
P-matries. Moreover, any GNE p⋆ = (p⋆1)
Q
q=1 of the game G satises
p∗q(k) ≤ pq(k) =
maxr∈Ω σ2r(k)
|Hqq(k)|
2
[(Zmax(R⋆))−1 (eR⋆ − 1)]
q
, ∀q ∈ Ω, ∀k ∈ N . (15)
Proof. See Appendix B.
To give additional insight into the physial interpretation of the existene onditions of a GNE,
we make expliit the dependene of eah hannel (power) gain |Hqr(k)|
2
on its own soure-destination
distane dqr by introduing the normalized hannel gain |Hqr(k)|
2 = |Hqr(k)|
2dγqr, where γ is the path
loss exponent. We have the following orollary.
Corollary 7 Suient onditions for the matries {Zk(R
⋆)} dened in (11) to be P-matries are:
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2
d γqq
d γqr
<
1
eR
⋆
q − 1
, ∀r ∈ Ω, ∀k ∈ N . (16)
8
Proof. The proof omes diretly from the suieny of the diagonally dominane property [32, De-
nition 2.2.19℄ for the matries Zk(R
⋆) in (11) to be P-matries [31, Theorem 6.2.3℄
Remark 8 A physial interpretation of the onditions in Theorem 5 (or Corollary 7) is the following.
Given the set of hannels and the rate onstraints, a GNE of G is guaranteed to exist if multiuser
interferene is suiently small (e.g., the links are suiently far apart). In fat, from (16), whih
quanties the onept of small interferene, one infers that, for any xed set of (normalized) hannels
and rate onstraints, there exists a minimum distane beyond whih an equilibrium exists, orrespond-
ing to the maximum level of interferene that may be tolerated from eah user. The amount of suh
a tolerable multiuser interferene depends on the rate onstraints: the larger the required rate from
eah user, the lower the level of interferene guaranteeing the existene of a solution. The reason why
an equilibrium of the game G might not exist for any given set of hannels and rate onstraints, is
that the multiuser system we onsider is interferene limited, and thus not every QoS requirement is
guaranteed to be feasible. In fat, in the game G , eah user ats to inrease the transmit power to
satisfy its own rate onstraint; whih leads to an inrease of the interferene against the users. It turns
out that, inreasing the transmit power of all the users does not guarantee that an equilibrium ould
exist for any given rate prole.
Observe that onditions in Theorem 5 also provide a simple admission ontrol proedure to hek
if a set of rate onstraints is feasible: under these onditions indeed, one an always nd a nite power
budget for all the users suh that there exists a GNE where all the rate onstraints are satised.
3.2 Uniqueness of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium
Before providing onditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G , we introdue the following
intermediate denitions. For any given rate prole R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 > 0, let B(R
⋆) ∈ RQ×Q be dened
as [
B(R⋆)
]
qr
≡
 e
−R⋆q , if q = r,
−eR
⋆
q β̂maxqr , otherwise,
(17)
where
β̂maxqr , max
k∈N
(
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hrr(k)|
2
σ2r (k) +
∑
r ′ 6=r |Hrr ′(k)|
2 pr ′(k)
σ2q(k)
)
, (18)
with pr ′(k) dened in (12). We also introdue χ and ρ, dened respetively as
χ , 1−max
q∈Ω
( eR⋆q − 1)∑
r 6=q
βmaxqr
 , (19)
with βmaxqr given in (14), and
ρ ,
eR
⋆
max − 1
eR
⋆
min − 1
, (20)
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with
R⋆max , max
q∈Ω
R⋆q , and R
⋆
min , min
q∈Ω
R⋆q . (21)
Suient onditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 Given the game G with a rate prole R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 > 0, assume that the onditions of
Theorem 5 are satised. If, in addition, B(R⋆) in (17) is a P-matrix, then the game G admits a unique
GNE.
Proof. See Appendix D.
More stringent but more intuitive onditions for the uniqueness of the GNE are given in the following
orollary.
Corollary 10 Given the game G with rate prole R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 > 0, assume that
0 < χ < 1, (22)
so that a GNE for the game G is guaranteed to exist, with χ dened in (19). Then, the GNE is unique
if the following onditions hold true∑
r 6=q
βmaxqr
{(
max
k∈N
σ2r (k)
σ2q (k)
)
+
[
max
r ′∈Ω
(
max
k ∈N
σ2r ′(k)
σ2q(k)
)] (
ρ
χ
− 1
)}
<
1
e2R
⋆
q
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (23)
with ρ dened in (20).
In partiular, when σ2r (k) = σ
2
q (n), ∀r, q ∈ Ω and ∀k, n ∈ N , onditions (23) beome∑
r 6=q
max
k ∈N
{
|Hqr(k)|
2
|H¯rr(k)|2
}
d γrr
d γqr
<
γ
eR
⋆
q − 1
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (24)
with
γ ,
max
q∈Ω
{
e−R
⋆
q − e−2R
⋆
q
}
eR
⋆
max − 1
eR
⋆
min − 1
+ max
q∈Ω
{
e−R
⋆
q − e−2R
⋆
q
} < 1. (25)
Proof. See Appendix E.
3.3 On the onditions for existene and uniqueness of the GNE
It is natural to ask whether the suient onditions as given by Theorem 5 (or the more general ones
given by Theorem 23 in Appendix A) are tight. In the next proposition, we show that these onditions
beome indeed neessary in the speial ase of N = 1 subhannel.
Proposition 11 Given the rate prole R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1, the following statements are equivalent for the
game G when N = 1:4
4
In the ase of N = 1, the power alloation pq(k) = pq of eah user, the hannel gains |Hrq(k)|
2 = |Hrq|
2
and the noise
varianes σ2q (k) = σ
2
q are independent on index k. Matrix Zk(R
⋆) = Z(R⋆) is dened as in (11), where eah |Hrq(k)|
2
is
replaed by |Hrq|
2
.
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(a) The problem (6) has a solution for some (all) (σ2q )
Q
q=1 > 0.
(b) The matrix Z(R⋆) is a P-matrix.
If any one of the above two statements holds, then the game G has a unique solution that is the unique
solution to the system of linear equations:
|Hqq|
2 pq − ( e
R⋆q − 1 )
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr|
2 pr = σ
2
q ( e
R⋆q − 1 ) ∀q ∈ Ω. (26)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 12 Proposition 11 also shows that it is, in general, very hard to obtain improved suient
ondition for the existene and boundedness of solutions to the problem with N > 1, as any suh
ondition must be implied by ondition (b) above for the the 1-subhannel ase, whih, as shown by
the proposition, is neessary for the said existene, and also for the uniqueness as it turns out.
Remark 13 Observe that, when N = 1, the game G leads to lassial SINR based salar power ontrol
problems in at-fading CDMA (or TDMA/FDMA) systems, where the goal of eah user is to reah a
presribed SINR (see (3)) with the minimum transmit power Pq [29℄. In this ase, given the rate prole
R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 and N = 1, the SINR target prole sinr
⋆ , (sinr⋆q)
Q
q=1, as required in lassial power
ontrol problems [29℄, an be equivalently written in terms of R⋆as
sinr
⋆
q = e
−R⋆q − 1, q ∈ Ω, (27)
and the Nash equilibria p⋆ = (p⋆q)
Q
q=1 of the game G beome the solutions of the following system of
linear equations
Z(R⋆)p⋆ =

σ21 sinr
⋆
1
.
.
.
σ2Qsinr
⋆
Q
 . (28)
Interestingly, the neessary and suient ondition (b) given in Proposition 11 is equivalent to that
known in the literature for the existene and uniqueness of the solution of the lassial SINR based
power ontrol problem (see, e.g., [29℄). Moreover, observe that, in the ase of N = 1, the solution of
the game G , oinides with the upper bound in (12).
Numerial example. Sine the existene and uniqueness onditions of the GNE given so far depend
on the hannel power gains
{
|Hqr(k)|
2
}
, there is a nonzero probability that they are not satised
for a given hannel realization drawn from a given probability spae and rate prole. To quantify the
adequay of our onditions, we tested them over a set of hannel impulse responses generated as vetors
omposed of L = 6 i.i.d. omplex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variane equal to the
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square distane between the assoiated transmitter-reeiver links (multipath Rayleigh fading model).
Eah user transmits over a set of N = 32 subarriers. We onsider a multiell ellular network as
depited in Figure 1a), omposed of 7 (regular) hexagonal ells, sharing the same band. Hene, the
transmissions from dierent ells typially interfere with eah other. For the simpliity of representation,
we assume that in eah ell there is only one ative link, orresponding to the transmission from the
base station (BS) to a mobile terminal (MT). Aording to this geometry, eah MT reeives a useful
signal that is omparable, in average sense, with the interferene signal transmitted by the BSs of
two adjaent ells. The overall network an be modeled as a 7-users interferene hannel, omposed
of 32 parallel subhannels. In Figure 1b), we plot the probability that existene (red line urves) and
uniqueness (blue line urves) onditions as given in Theorem 5 and Theorem 9, respetively, are satised
versus the (normalized) distane d ∈ [0, 1) [see Figure 1a)℄, between eah MT and his BS (assumed
to be equal for all the MT/BS pairs). We onsidered two dierent rate proles, namely R⋆q = 1
bit/symb/subhannel (square markers) and R⋆q = 2 bit/symb/subhannel (ross markers), ∀q ∈ Ω. As
expeted, the probability of existene and uniqueness of the GNE inreases as eah MT approahes his
BS (i.e., d→ 1), orresponding to a derease of the interell interferene.
4 Distributed Algorithms
The game G was shown to admit a GNE, under some tehnial onditions, where eah user attains
the desired information rate with the minimum transmit power, given the power alloations at the
equilibrium of the others. In this setion, we fous on algorithms to ompute these solutions. Sine we
are interested in a deentralized implementation, where no signaling among dierent users is allowed,
we onsider totally distributed algorithms, where eah user ats independently to optimize its own
power alloation while pereiving the other users as interferene. More speially, we propose two
alternative totally distributed algorithms based on the waterlling solution in (7), and provide a unied
set of onvergene onditions for both algorithms.
4.1 Sequential iterative waterlling algorithm
The sequential Iterative Waterlling Algorithm (IWFA) we propose is an instane of the Gauss-Seidel
sheme (by whih, eah user's power is sequentially updated [22℄) based on the mapping (7): Eah
player, sequentially and aording to a xed updating order, solves problem (6), performing the single-
user waterlling solution in (7). The sequential IWFA is desribed in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Sequential Iterative Waterlling Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any nonnegative vetor;
for n = 0 : Number_of_ iterations,
p(n+1)q =
 WFq
(
p
(n)
−q
)
, if (n + 1)modQ = q,
p
(n)
q , otherwise,
∀q ∈ Ω; (29)
end
The onvergene of the algorithm is guaranteed under the following suient onditions.
Theorem 14 Assuming Number_of_ iterations = ∞, the sequential IWFA, desribed in Algorithm
1, onverges linearly
5
to the unique GNE of the game G , if the onditions of Theorem 9 are satised.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Remark 15 Observe that the onvergene of the algorithm is guaranteed under the same onditions
obtained for the uniqueness of the solution of the game. As expeted, the onvergene is ensured if the
level of interferene in the network is not too high.
Remark 16 The main features of the proposed algorithm are its low-omplexity and distributed na-
ture. In fat, despite the oupling among the users' admissible strategies due to the rate onstraints, the
algorithm an be implemented in a totally distributed way, sine eah user, to ompute the waterlling
solution (7), only needs to loally measure the interferene-plus-noise power over the N subhannels
[see (3)℄ and waterll over this level.
Remark 17 Despite its appealing properties, the sequential IWFA desribed in Algorithm 1may suer
from slow onvergene if the number of users in the network is large, as we will also show numerially
in Setion 4.2. This drawbak is due to the sequential shedule in the users' updates, wherein eah
user, to hoose its own strategy, is fored to wait for all the other users sheduled before it. It turns
out that the sequential shedule, as in Algorithm 1, does not really gain from the distributed nature
of the multiuser system, where eah user, in priniple, is able to hange its own strategy, irrespetive
of the update times of the other users. Moreover, to be performed, the sequential update requires a
entralized synhronization mehanism that determines the order and the update times of the users.
We address more preisely this issue in the next setion.
5
A sequene {xn} is said to onverge linearly to x
⋆
if there is a onstant 0 < c < 1 suh that ||xn+1−x
⋆|| ≤ c||xn−x
⋆||
for all n ≥ n¯ and some n¯ ∈ N.
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4.2 Simultaneous iterative waterlling algorithm
To overome the drawbak of the possible slow speed of onvergene, we onsider in this setion the
simultaneous version of the IWFA, alled simultaneous Iterative-waterlling Algorithm. The algorithm
is an instane of the Jaobi sheme [22℄: At eah iteration, the users update their own PSD simulta-
neously, performing the waterlling solution (7), given the interferene generated by the other users in
the previous iteration. The simultaneous IWFA is desribed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Simultaneous Iterative Waterlling Algorithm
Set p
(0)
q = any nonnegative vetor, ∀q ∈ Ω;
for n = 0 : Number_of_ iterations
p(n+1)q = WFq
(
p
(n)
1 , . . . ,p
(n)
q−1,p
(n)
q+1, . . . ,p
(n)
Q
)
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (30)
end
Interestingly, (suient) onditions for the onvergene of the simultaneous IWFA are the same as
those required by the sequential IWFA, as given in the following.
Theorem 18 Assuming Number_of_ iterations = ∞, the simultaneous IWFA, desribed in Algo-
rithm 2, onverges linearly to the unique GNE of the game G , if the onditions of Theorem 9 are
satised.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Remark 19 Sine the simultaneous IWFA is still based on the waterlling solution (7), it keeps the
most appealing features of the sequential IWFA, namely its low-omplexity and distributed nature. In
addition, thanks to the Jaobi-based update, all the users are allowed to hoose their optimal power
alloation simultaneously. Hene, the simultaneous IWFA is expeted to be faster than the sequential
IWFA, espeially if the number of ative users in the network is large.
Numerial Example. As an example, in Figure 2, we ompare the performane of the sequential and
simultaneous IWFA, in terms of onvergene speed. We onsider a network omposed of 10 links and
we show the rate evolution of three of the links orresponding to the sequential IWFA and simultaneous
IWFA as a funtion of the iteration index n as dened in Algorithms 1 and 2. In Figure 2a) we onsider
a rate prole for the users with two dierent lasses of servie; whereas in Figure 2b) the same target
rate for all the users is required. As expeted, the sequential IWFA is slower than the simultaneous
IWFA, espeially if the number of ative links Q is large, sine eah user is fored to wait for all the
other users sheduled before updating its power alloation.
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5 Conlusions
In this paper we have onsidered the distributed power alloation in Gaussian parallel interferene
hannels, subjet to QoS onstraints. More speially, we have proposed a new game theoreti for-
mulation of the power ontrol problem, where eah user aims at minimizing the transmit power while
guaranteeing a presribed information rate. We have provided suient onditions for the nonempti-
ness and the boundedness of the solution set of the Nash problem. These onditions suggest a simple
admission ontrol proedure to hek the feasibility of any given users' rate prole. As expeted, there
exists a trade-o between the performane ahievable from eah user (i.e., the ahievable information
rate) and the maximum level of interferene that may be tolerated in the network. Under some ad-
ditional onditions we have shown that the solution of the generalized Nash problem is unique and
we have proved the onvergene of two distributed algorithms: The sequential and the simultaneous
IWFAs. Interestingly, although the rate onstraints indue a oupling among the feasible strategies of
the users, both algorithms are totally distributed, sine eah user, to ompute the waterlling solution,
only needs to measure the noise-plus-interferene power aross the subhannels. Our results are thus
appealing in all the pratial distributed multipoint-to-multipoint systems, either wired or wireless,
where entralized power ontrol tehniques are not allowed and QoS in terms of information rate must
be guaranteed for eah link.
One interesting diretion that is worth of further investigations is the generalization of the proposed
algorithms to the ase of asynhronous transmission and totally asynhronous updates among the users,
as did in [13℄ for the rate maximization game.
6 Appendies
A Proof of Theorem 5
We derive Theorem 5 as a orollary to the more general Theorem 23 below. In order to prove this
theorem we need several preliminary onepts and results though, as given next.
A.1 Noiseless game
We rewrite rst the KKT optimality onditions of the Nash problem (6) as a Mixed nonlinear Comple-
mentarity Problem (MNCP) [17, 32℄. Denoting by µq,k the multipliers of the nonnegativity onstraints
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and by λq the multipliers of the rate onstraint, the KKT onditions of problems (6) an be written as:
1− µq,k − λq
|Hqq(k)|
2
σ2
q
(k) +
∑Q
r=1 |Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k)
= 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ pq(k) ⊥ µq,k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ λq ⊥
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 pq(k)
σ2
q
(k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k)
)
−R⋆q ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Ω,
(31)
where a ⊥ b means the two salars (or vetors) a and b are orthogonal. Observe that eah λq > 0;
otherwise omplementarity yields pq(k) = 0 for all k ∈ N , whih ontradits the rate onstraints.
Eliminating the multipliers {µq,k} orresponding to the nonnegativity onstraints and making some
obvious saling, the KKT onditions in (31) are equivalent to the following MNCP:
0 ≤ pq(k) ⊥ σ
2
q(k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)− |Hqq(k)|
2 λq ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω.
0 ≤ λq,
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)
)
= R⋆q , ∀q ∈ Ω.
(32)
To proeed further we introdue an additional game, whih has the same struture of the game G ,
exept for the players' payo funtions, dened as in (2), but with σ2q (k) = 0 for all k ∈ N and q ∈ Ω.
We will refer to this game as the noiseless game. Although the noiseless game does not orrespond to
any realisti ommuniation system, it will be shown to be instrumental in understanding the behavior
of the original game G when all σ2q(k) > 0.
Note that the onditions σ2q (k) > 0 ensure that all the users' rates Rq(pq,p−q) in (2) of the G in (6)
are well-dened for all nonnegative p , (pq)
Q
q=1, with pq , (pq(k))
N
k=1. Nevertheless, when σ
2
q (k) = 0,
the players' payo funtions
6 Rq(pq,p−q) of the noiseless game still remain well-dened as long as∑Q
r=1 p r(k) > 0, provided that we allow for a rate equal to ∞. Most importantly, the MNCP (32) is
well dened for all nonnegative σ2q (k), inluding the ase when σ
2
q (k) = 0 for all k ∈ N and q ∈ Ω. The
latter observation motivates the following denition.
Denition 20 A set of user powers p , (pq)
Q
q=1, with pq , (pq(k))
N
k=1, is said to be an almost GNE
of the noiseless game if there exists a set of nonnegative salars {vq}
Q
q=1 suh that
0 ≤ p q(k) ⊥
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)− |Hqq(k)|
2 vq ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω. (33)
We all these solutions noiseless almost equilibria, and denote the set of noiseless equilibria by NE0. 
The set NE0 of users' noiseless almost equilibria onstitutes a losed, albeit not neessarily onvex,
one in the spae of all users' powers. A noteworthy point about suh an almost equilibrium is the
6
With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbol to denote the payo funtions of the players in the game G
in (6) and in the noiseless game.
16
following simple property, whih asserts that in the noiseless game, every subhannel will be used by
at least one user.
Proposition 21 If p ∈ NE0, and p 6= 0, then
∑Q
r=1 p r(k) > 0 for all k ∈ N .
Proof. Let p ∈ NE0 be suh that p q0(k0) > 0 for some pair (q0, k0). By omplementarity (see (33)),
we have
|Hq0q0(k0)|
2 vq0 =
Q∑
r=1
|Hq0r(k0)|
2 pr(k0) > 0, (34)
whih implies
Q∑
r=1
|Hq0r(k)|
2 pr(k) ≥ |Hq0q0(k)|
2 vq0 > 0, ∀k ∈ N , (35)
sine the |Hqr(k)|
2
are all positive. Equation (35) learly implies:
Q∑
r=1
p r(k) > 0, ∀k ∈ N ,
as laimed by the proposition.
A.2 The noiseless asymptoti one
Another mathematial onept we need is that of asymptoti diretion of a (nononvex) set that we
borrow from reession analysis [30℄.
Given the game G with rate prole R⋆ , (R⋆q)
Q
q=1, it is possible that the sets of powers p that allow
the user to ahieve this rate be unbounded. In essene, the asymptoti onsideration below aims at
identifying suh unbounded user powers. Speially, we onsider the following noisy nononvex level
set of users' powers orresponding to R⋆:
Pσ(R⋆) ≡
{
p ≥ 0 :
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2pr(k)
)
= R⋆q , ∀q ∈ Ω
}
, (36)
where σ , (σq)
Q
q=1, with σq , (σ
2
q (k))
N
k=1. The asymptoti one of P
σ(R⋆), denoted by Pσ∞(R
⋆), is
the one (not neessarily onvex) of diretions d , (dq )
Q
q=1 , with dq, ( dq (k))
N
k=1 , suh that
d = lim
ν→∞
pν
τν
(37)
for some sequene of salars { τν }
∞
ν=1 tending to ∞ and some sequene of powers {p
ν }∞ν=1 suh that
pν ∈ Pσ(R⋆) for all ν.
It is known [30, Proposition 2.1.2℄ that Pσ(R⋆) is bounded if and only if Pσ∞(R
⋆) = {0}. Whereas
the individual sets Pσ(R⋆) are dependent on σ2q(k), it turns out that the asymptoti ones of all these
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sets are the same and equal to the following noiseless level set of users' powers:
P0(R⋆) ≡
d, (d q )Qq=1 ≥ 0 :
∑
k:
PQ
r=1 dr(k)>0
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 d q(k)∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 d r(k)
)
≤ R⋆q , ∀q ∈ Ω
 ,
where by onvention the vauous summation is dened to be zero (i.e., by denition, P0(R⋆) ontains
the origin). The laim about the equality of Pσ∞(R
⋆
) for a xed R
⋆
is formally stated and proved in
the result below.
Proposition 22 For any σ > 0, Pσ∞(R
⋆
) = P0(R
⋆
).
Proof. Let σ > 0 be arbitrary. Let d ∈ Pσ∞(R
⋆
) and {(pν , τν)} be a sequene satisfying the denition
of d in (37). For eah q ∈ Ω and all ν, we have
R⋆q ≥
N∑
k=1
log
 1 + |Hqq(k)|2 pνq (k)σ2q (k) +∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2 pνr (k)

≥
∑
k:
PQ
r=1 dr(k)>0
log
 1 + |Hqq(k)|2 pνq (k)σ2q (k) +∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2 pνr (k)

=
∑
k:
PQ
r=1 dr(k)>0
log
 1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2
pνq (k)
τν
σ2q (k)
τν
+
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
pνr (k)
τν
 .
(38)
Taking the limit ν →∞ establishes the inlusion Pσ∞(R
⋆) ⊆ P0(R⋆).
Conversely, it is lear that 0 ∈ Pσ(R⋆). Let d be a nonzero vetor in P0(R⋆). For any salar
θ > 0, we have, for all q ∈ Ω,
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
θ |Hqq(k)|
2 d q(k)
σ2q (k) + θ
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 d r(k)
)
=
∑
k:
PQ
r=1 dr(k)>0
log
(
1 +
θ |Hqq(k)|
2 d q(k)
σ2q (k) + θ
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 d r(k)
)
≤
∑
k:
PQ
r=1 dr(k)>0
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 d q(k)∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 d r(k)
)
.
(39)
Hene θd ∈ Pσ(R⋆) for all θ > 0. It follows that d ∈ Pσ∞(R
⋆).
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We are now ready to introdue the key objet in our proof of Theorem 23, the one NE0 ∩P
0(R⋆),
whih by Proposition 22, is equal to {0} ∪ N̂E0(R
⋆), where
N̂ E0(R
⋆) ,
{
d ∈ NE0 \ {0 } :
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 d q(k)∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 d r(k)
)
≤ R⋆q , ∀q ∈ Ω
}
= NE0 ∩ P
0(R⋆) \ {0 }.
(40)
Notie that d ∈ N̂E0(R
⋆) implies
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2d r(k) > 0 for all q ∈ Ω and all k ∈ N .
A.3 Existene results
With the above preparation, we are ready to present our main existene theorem. The emptiness of
the set N̂ E0(R
⋆) dened in (40) turns out to provide a suient ondition for the MNCP (32) to have
a nonempty bounded solution set.
Theorem 23 Given the game G with rate prole R⋆ , (R⋆q)
Q
q=1 > 0, if N̂ E0(R
⋆) = ∅, then the game
has a nonempty and bounded solution set, for all σ > 0.
Proof. We rst note that the KKT onditions of the Nash problem dened in (6) are equivalent to
the following nonlinear omplementarity problem (NCP) (see (31) and omments thereafter)
0 ≤ p q(k) ⊥ σ
2
q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2 p r(k)− |Hqq(k)|
2 λq ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ λq ⊥
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 p q(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 p r(k)
)
−R⋆q ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Ω,
(41)
In turn, to show that (41) has a solution, it sues to prove that the solutions of the augmented NCP
0 ≤ p q(k) ⊥ σ
2
q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2 p r(k)− |Hqq(k)|
2λq + τ p q(k) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ λq ⊥
N∑
k=1
log
 1 + |Hqq(k)|2p q(k)σ2q(k) +∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2p r(k)
−R⋆q + τ λq ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Ω,
for all τ > 0 are bounded [17, Theorem 2.6.1℄.
We show the latter boundedness property by ontradition. Assume that for some sequene of
positive salars {τν}, a sequene of solutions {(p
ν , τν)} exists suh that eah pair (p
ν , τν) satises:
0 ≤ pνq (k) ⊥ σ
2
q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2pνr (k)− |Hqq(k)|
2 λνq + τν p
ν
q(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ λνq ⊥
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 pνq (k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 pνr (k)
)
−R⋆q + τν λ
ν
q ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Ω,
(42)
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and that
lim
ν→∞
 ‖pν ‖+ Q∑
q=1
λνq
 = ∞. (43)
From (42), it is lear that λνq > 0 for all ν and q. In fat, if a λ
ν
q = 0, then by the rst omplemen-
tarity ondition, pνq(k) = 0 for all k, whih is not possible by the last inequality in (42).
Thus, it follows from the seond omplementarity ondition that
N∑
k=1
log
 1 + |Hqq(k)|2 pνq (k)σ2q(k) +∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2pνr (k)
−R⋆q + τν λνq = 0, (44)
whih implies that the sequene {τνλ
ν
q} is bounded for eah q ∈ Ω. We laim that limν→∞ τν = 0.
Otherwise, for some subsequene {τν : ν ∈ κ}, where κ is an innite index set, we have
lim infν(∈κ)→∞ τν > 0. Thus, the subsequene {λ
ν
q : ν ∈ κ} is bounded for all q ∈ Ω. The rst
omplementarity ondition in (42) then implies that {pνq (k) : ν ∈ κ} is bounded for all q ∈ Ω and
k ∈ N . This is a ontradition to (43). Therefore, the sequene {τν} ↓ 0.
Consider now the normalized sequene {pν/‖pν‖}, whih must have at least one aumulation
point; moreover, any suh point must be nonzero. Let d∞ be any suh point. It is not diult to show
that d∞ is a nonzero almost noiseless equilibrium. Moreover, from the inequality:
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 pνq (k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 pνr (k)
)
−R⋆q ≤ 0, (45)
whih is implied by (44), it is equally easy to show that d∞ ∈ P0(R⋆). Therefore, d∞ is an element
of N̂ E0(R
⋆), whih is a ontradition. This ompletes the proof of the existene of a solution to the
problem (32). The boundedness of suh solutions an be proved in a similar way via ontradition and
by the same normalization argument. The details are not repeated.
Roughly speaking, the key ondition N̂ E0(R
⋆) = ∅ in the previous theorem is just the mathematial
requirement that if the power p goes to innity staying feasible, the system annot approah a (noiseless)
equilibrium. As suh the previous theorem is rather natural, although it does not provide an eetive
way of heking the existene and boundedness of the solutions. To this end, however, we an now
easily derive Theorem 5 from Theorem 23.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
In order to prove Theorem 5 we introdue a simple polyhedral set that will turn out to be a subset of
Pσ(R⋆).
P∞(R
⋆) ,
N∏
k=1
{
r(k) ∈ RQ+ : Zk(R
⋆)r(k) ≤ 0
}
, (46)
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whih is independent of the σ and where, we reall, the matries Zk(R
⋆) are dened by (11). The key
property for the existene Theorem 5 is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 24 N̂ E0(R
⋆) ⊆ P∞(R
⋆) ∩ (NE0 \ {0}).
Proof. It sues to note the following string of impliations:
p ∈ N̂E0(R
⋆) ⇒ log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 p q(k)∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 p r(k)
)
≤ R⋆q , ∀ q ∈ Ω,
⇔ |Hqq(k)|
2 p q(k) ≤ ( e
R⋆q − 1 )
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2 p r(k), ∀ q ∈ Ω,
⇔ p ∈ P∞(R
⋆).
(47)
where the middle equivalene is by simple exponentiation.
It is known that, sine eah matrix Zk(R
⋆) is a Z-matrix, if eah matrix Zk(R
⋆) is also a P-matrix,
then a positive vetor s(k) , (sq(k))
Q
q=1 exists suh that s
T (k)Zk(R
⋆) > 0 [32, Theorem 3.3.4℄. But
this implies that P∞(R
⋆) = {0}, and thus N̂ E0(R
⋆) = ∅. The rst assertion of Theorem 5 then follows
immediately from Theorem 23. It remains to establish the bound on the p(k) = (pq(k))
Q
q=1. This
follows easily from the following two fats: 1) any solution p of (32) must belong to the set Pσ(R⋆);
2) a Z-matrix that is also a P-matrix must have a nonnegative inverse.
B Proof of Corollary 6
Consider the matrix Zmax(R⋆) dened by (13) in Corollary 6, and assume it is a P-matrix. Set
D(k) , Diag
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
)Q
q=1
. The rst assertion in the Corollary is immediate beause
Zk(R
⋆) ≥ Zmax(R⋆)D(k), ∀k ∈ N , (48)
where the inequality is intended omponent-wise. Therefore, sine all the matries involved are Z-
matries, from the assumption on Zmax(R⋆), it follows that all the Zk(R
⋆) are also P-matries.7 Lets
now prove the bounds (15). Note rst that
σ21(k) ( e
R∗
1 − 1 )
.
.
.
σ2Q(k) ( e
R∗Q − 1 )
 ≤
[
max
r∈Ω
σ2r (k)
]
( eR
∗
− 1 ), ∀k ∈ N . (49)
Furthermore we reall that, by (48), we have [Zk(R
⋆)]−1 ≤ [Zmax(R⋆)D(k)]−1 [32℄, and also that the
inverse of a matrix that is P and Z is nonnegative [32, Theorem 3.11.10℄. From all these fats, and
7
The last statement an be easily proved using [32, Lemma 5.3.14℄.
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realling (12), the following hain of inequalities easily follows for every k ∈ N :
D(k)

p1(k)
.
.
.
pQ(k)
 ≤ D(k) [Zk(R⋆) ]−1

σ21(k) ( e
R⋆
1 − 1 )
.
.
.
σ2Q(k) ( e
R⋆
Q − 1 )

≤
[
max
r∈Ω
σ2r (k)
]
[Zmax(R⋆)]−1 ( eR
⋆
− 1 ), (50)
whih provides the desired bound (15).
C Proof of Proposition 11
We prove that the following three statements are equivalent for game G when N = 1:
(a) The game has a nonempty solution set;
(b) The matrix Z(R⋆) is a P-matrix;
() N̂ E0(R
⋆) = ∅.
(a) ⇒ (b). Sine N = 1, any solution of (32) satises the equations
log
 1 + |Hqq(k)|2p q(k)σ2q(k) +∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2p r(k)
 = R⋆q , ∀q ∈ Ω,
whih are easily seen to be equivalent to (26). Sine the right-hand onstants in (26) are positive, it
follows that a vetor r⋆ , (r⋆q )
Q
q=1 ≥ 0, whih is the solution of (32) with N = 1, exists satisfying
Z(R⋆)r⋆ > 0. Hene (b) follows [32, Theorem 3.3.4℄, [31, Theorem 6.2.3℄. The impliations (b) ⇒ ()
⇒ (a) ome diretly from the more general ase N ≥ 1. Hene (a), (b), and () are equivalent.
It remains to establish the assertion about the uniqueness of the solution. But this is lear beause
any one of the three statements (a), (b), or () implies that the matrix Z(R⋆) is a P-matrix, thus
nonsingular [31, Theorem 6.2.3℄; and hene the system of linear equations (26) has a unique solution.
D Proof of Theorem 9
The study of the uniqueness of the solution of the GNEP is ompliated by the presene of a oupling
among the feasible strategy sets of the users, due to the rate onstraints. To overome this diulty
we rst introdue a hange of variables of the game G , from the power variables pq(k) to a set of rate
22
variables, in order to obtain an equivalent formulation of the original generalized Nash problem as a
Variational Inequality (VI) problem, dened on the Cartesian produt of the users' rate admissible
sets. Then, building on this VI formulation, we derive suient onditions for the uniqueness of the
GNE of the original game. It is important to remark that our VI formulation of the game G diers
from that of [11℄. In fat, in [11℄ the rate maximization game was formulated as an Ane VI dened
on the Cartesian produt of the users' power sets [11, Proposition 2℄. Our VI instead, is dened by a
nonlinear funtion, whih signiantly ompliates the uniqueness analysis, as detailed next.
D.1 VI formulation
Hereafter we assume that onditions of Theorem 5 are satised, so that a GNE of the game G is
guaranteed to exist.
Given the game G we introdue the following hange of variables:
rq(k) , log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k)
)
, k ∈ N , q ∈ Ω, (51)
with rq(k) satisfying the onstraints
rq(k) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω, and
N∑
k=1
rq(k) = R
⋆
q , ∀q ∈ Ω. (52)
Observe that eah rq(k) = 0 if and only if pq(k) = 0. Given r(k) , (rq(k))
Q
q=1, let us dene the Z-matrix
Zk(r(k)) ∈ R
Q×Q
as:
Zk(r(k)) ,

|H11(k)|
2 −(er1(k) − 1) |H12(k)|
2 · · · −(er1(k) − 1) |H1Q(k)|
2
−(er2(k) − 1) |H21(k)|
2 |H22(k)|
2 · · · −(er2(k) − 1) |H2Q(k)|
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−(erQ(k) − 1) |HQ1(k)|
2 −(erQ(k) − 1) |HQ2(k)|
2 · · · |HQQ(k)|
2

.
(53)
From (52), we have Zk(r(k)) ≥ Zk(R
⋆) for all k ∈ N , where Zk(R
⋆) is dened in (11). It follows that
eah Zk(r(k)) is a P-matrix.
Aording to (51), the users' powers p(k) , (pq(k))
Q
q=1 are related to the rates r(k) by the following
funtion 
p1(k)
.
.
.
pQ(k)
 = φ(k, r(k)) , (Zk(r(k)))−1

σ21(k) ( e
r1(k) − 1 )
.
.
.
σ2Q(k) ( e
rQ(k) − 1 )
 , k ∈ N . (54)
Observe that (Zk(r(k)))
−1
is well-dened, sine Zk(r(k)) is a P-matrix [32, Theorem 3.11.10℄.
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Using (52) and (54), and the fat that eah pq(k) = 0 if and only if rq(k) = 0, the KKT onditions
of the Nash problem (6) an be rewritten as (see (32)):
0 ≤ rq(k) ⊥ σ
2
q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2 φr(k, r(k)) − |Hqq(k)|
2 λq ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω
0 ≤ λq,
N∑
k=1
rq(k) = R
⋆
q , ∀q ∈ Ω
(55)
where φr(k, r(k)) denotes the r-th omponent of φ(k, r(k)), dened in (54). It is easy to see that (55)
is equivalent to (note that as usual λq > 0 for any solution of (55)), ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ rq(k) ⊥ log
(
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2 φr(k, r(k))
)
− log
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
)
+ νq ≥ 0,
νq free,
N∑
k=1
rq(k) = R
⋆
q ,
(56)
Let us dene
Φq(k, r(k)) , log
(
σ2q(k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2 φr(k, r(k))
)
− log
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
)
, k ∈ N , q ∈ Ω.
Φq(r) , (Φq(k, r(k)))
N
k=1, Φ(r) , (Φq(r))
Q
q=1, r , (rq)
Q
q=1,
(57)
with rq , (rq(k))
N
k=1. Observe that eah Φq(k, r(k)) in (57) is a well-dened ontinuously dieren-
tiable funtion on the retangular box [0,R⋆] ,
∏Q
q=1 [0,R
⋆
q ] ⊂ R
Q
; thus Φ in (57) is a well-dened
ontinuously dierentiable funtion on [0,R⋆]N .
Using (57), one an see that (56) are the KKT onditions of the VI (U,Φ) [17, Proposition 1.3.4℄,
where U is the Cartesian produt of users' rate sets, dened as
U ≡
Q∏
q=1
Uq, where Uq ,
{
rq ∈ R
N
+ :
N∑
k=1
rq(k) = R
⋆
q
}
, (58)
and Φ is the ontinuously dierentiable funtion on [0,R⋆]N dened in (57).
By denition, it follows that a tuple r⋆ , (r⋆q)
Q
q=1 is a solution of the VI(U,Φ) dened above if and
only if, for all rq ∈ Uq and q ∈ Ω,
N∑
k=1
(
rq(k) − r
⋆
q(k)
) [
log
(
σ2q (k) +
Q∑
r=1
|Hqr(k)|
2 φr(k, r
⋆
k)
)
− log
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
) ]
≥ 0. (59)
We rewrite now ondition (59) in a more useful form. To this end, let introdue
τq(k,p(k)) , σ
2
q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k), k ∈ N , q ∈ Ω, (60)
with p(k) , ( pq(k))
Q
q=1 . For any solution p
⋆ = (p⋆(k))Nk=1 of (31) (i.e., any GNE of the game G we
have p⋆ ≤ p¯, where p¯ = (p¯(k))Nk=1, with p¯(k) = (p¯r(k))
Q
r=1 and p¯r(k) dened in (12). It follows that
σ2q (k) ≤ τq(k,p
⋆(k)) ≤ τ¯q(k) , σ
2
q (k) +
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2 p¯r(k), ∀k ∈ N , ∀q ∈ Ω. (61)
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Using (60), we an write
log
σ2q (k) + Q∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2 pr(k) + |Hqq(k)|
2 pq(k)
 = rq(k) + log (τq(k,p(k)) ) , (62)
so that ondition (59) beomes
N∑
k=1
(
rq(k)− r
⋆
q(k)
) (
log (τq(k,p
⋆(k)) ) − log
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
)
+ r⋆q(k)
)
≥ 0, ∀ rq ∈ Uq, ∀q ∈ Ω, (63)
where τq(k,p
⋆(k)) is dened in (60) and p⋆(k) , (p⋆q(k))
Q
q=1, with eah p
⋆
q(k) = φq(k, r
⋆(k)), and φq(·)
given in (54). Condition (63) will be instrumental for the study of the uniqueness of the GNE, as shown
next.
D.2 Uniqueness analysis
Building on (63), we derive now suient onditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G .
Let p̂ (ν) , (p̂
(ν)
q )
Q
q=1, for ν = 1, 2, be any two solutions of the Nash problem in (6). Given ν = 1, 2,
k ∈ N , and q ∈ Ω, let us dene
r̂(ν)q (k) , log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(ν)
q (k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r 6=q |Hqr(k)|
2 p̂
(ν)
r (k)
)
, and τ̂ (ν)q (k) , τq(k, p̂
(ν)(k)). (64)
Adding the following two inequalities, whih are obtained from the haraterization (63) of a solution
to the VI (U,Φ):
N∑
k=1
(
r̂ (2)q (k)− r̂
(1)
q (k)
) (
− log
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
)
+ log(τ̂ (1)q (k)) + r̂
(1)
q (k)
)
≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Ω, (65)
and
N∑
k=1
(
r̂ (1)q (k) − r̂
(2)
q (k)
) (
− log
(
|Hqq(k)|
2
)
+ log(τ̂ (2)q (k)) + r̂
(2)
q (k)
)
≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Ω, (66)
and rearranging terms, we obtain
N∑
k=1
(
r̂ (2)q (k) − r̂
(1)
q (k)
)2
≤
N∑
k=1
(
r̂ (2)q (k)− r̂
(1)
q (k)
) (
log(τ̂ (1)q (k)) − log(τ̂
(2)
q (k))
)
≤
√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
r̂
(2)
q (k)− r̂
(1)
q (k)
)2√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
log(τ̂
(1)
q (k)) − log(τ̂
(2)
q (k))
)2
∀q ∈ Ω,
whih implies ∥∥∥ r̂(2)q − r̂(1)q ∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥ log(τ̂ (2)q )− log(τ̂ (1)q )∥∥∥
2
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (67)
where τ̂
(ν)
q , (τ̂
(ν)
q (k))Nk=1, for ν = 1, 2, and log(τ̂
(ν)
q ) has to be intended as the vetor whose k-th
omponent is log(τ̂
(ν)
q (k)).
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Invoking the mean-value theorem for the logarithmi funtion, we have that there exists some salar
sq(k) suh that
|Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(2)
q (k)
τ̂
(2)
q (k)
≤ sq(k) ≤ |Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(1)
q (k)
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
, (68)
and, for eah q ∈ Ω and k ∈ N ,
r̂ (2)q (k)− r̂
(1)
q (k) = log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(2)
q (k)
τ̂
(2)
q (k)
)
− log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(1)
q (k)
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
)
=
(
p̂
(2)
q (k)
τ̂
(2)
q (k)
−
p̂
(1)
q (k)
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
)
|Hqq(k)|
2
1 + sq(k)
=
(
p̂
(2)
q (k)− p̂
(1)
q (k)
τ̂
(2)
q (k)
)
|Hqq(k)|
2
1 + sq(k)
+
(
1
τ̂
(2)
q (k)
−
1
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
)
|Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(1)
q (k)
1 + sq(k)
=
( p̂(2)q (k)− p̂(1)q (k)) + p̂(1)q (k)
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2
(
p̂(1)r (k)− p̂
(2)
r (k)
)
·
|Hqq(k)|
2
τ̂
(2)
q (k) ( 1 + sq(k) )
. (69)
Similarly, there exists some salar ωq(k) suh that
τ̂ (2)q (k) ≤ ωq(k) ≤ τ̂
(1)
q (k), (70)
and, for eah q ∈ Ω and k ∈ N ,
log(τ̂ (2)q (k))− log(τ̂
(1)
q (k)) =
1
ωq(k)
( τ̂ (2)q (k)− τ̂
(1)
q (k) ) =
1
ωq(k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2 ( p̂(2)r (k)− p̂
(1)
r (k) ).
(71)
Introduing
εq(k) , |Hqq(k)|
2(p̂(2)q (k)− p̂
(1)
q (k)), (72)
and using (69) and (71), the inequality (67) beomes√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 εq(k) + |Hqq(k)|2 p̂(1)q (k)
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k) − p̂
(1)
r (k)
) 1
τ̂
(2)
q (k) ( 1 + sq(k) )
2
≤
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 1
ωq(k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k)− p̂
(1)
r (k)
)2.
(73)
By the triangle inequality and rearranging terms, from (73) it follows√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
εq(k)
τ̂
(2)
q (k) ( 1 + sq(k) )
)2
≤
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 1
ωq(k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k)− p̂
(1)
r (k)
)2
+
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 |Hqq(k)|2 p̂(1)q (k)
τ̂
(1)
q (k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k)− p̂
(1)
r (k)
) 1
τ̂
(2)
q (k) ( 1 + sq(k) )
2.
(74)
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We bound now (74) using the following: ∀q ∈ Ω, ∀k ∈ N ,
|Hqq(k)|
2 p̂
(ν)
q (k)
τ̂
(ν)
q (k)
≤ e−R
⋆
q − 1, ν = 1, 2, (75)
1
1 + sq(k)
≥ e−R
⋆
q , (76)
1
τ¯q(k)
≤
1
τ̂
(ν)
q (k)
≤
1
σ2q(k)
, ν = 1, 2, (77)
1
ωq(k)
≤
1
σ2q(k)
, (78)
where (75) follows from (52), (76) from (68) and (75), (77) from (61), and (78) from (70). Using
(75)-(78), (74) an be bound as
e−R
⋆
q
√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
εq(k)
τ¯q(k)
)2
≤
√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
εq(k)
τ̂
(2)
q (k) ( 1 + sq(k) )
)2
(79)
≤
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
eR⋆q − 1
σ2q (k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k) − p̂
(1)
r (k)
)2
+
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 1
σ2q(k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k)− p̂
(1)
r (k)
)2
(80)
= eR
⋆
q
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 1
σ2q(k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|2
(
p̂
(2)
r (k)− p̂
(1)
r (k)
)2
(81)
= eR
⋆
q
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
∑
r 6=q
β̂qr(k)
(
εr(k)
τ¯r(k)
)2
(82)
≤ eR
⋆
q
∑
r 6=q
(
max
k∈N
β̂qr(k)
)√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
εr(k)
τ¯r(k)
)2
, ∀q ∈ Ω, (83)
where: (79) follows from (76) and (77); (80) follows from (75), (77) and (78); and in (82) we have
dened
β̂qr(k) ,
τ¯r(k)
σ2q(k)
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hrr(k)|2
, q, r ∈ Ω, and k ∈ N . (84)
Let B = B(R⋆) , [bqr]
Q
q,r=1 be the nonnegative matrix, where
bqr ,

e−R
⋆
q
if i = j
eR
⋆
q max
k∈N
β̂qr(k) if i 6= j,
(85)
and let B be the omparison matrix of B, i.e., the matrix whose diagonal entries are the same as
those of B and the o-diagonal entries are the negatives of those of B (see (17)). Note that B is a
Z-matrix.
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Introduing
tq ,
√√√√ N∑
k=1
(
εq(k)
τ¯q(k)
)2
, q ∈ Ω, (86)
with εq(k) dened in (72), and onatenating the inequalities in (79) for all q ∈ Ω, we dedue
Bt ≤ 0, (87)
with t , (tq)
Q
q=1. If B is a P-matrix, then it must have a nonnegative inverse [32, Theorem 3.11.10℄.
Thus, by (87), we have t ≤ 0, whih yields t = 0. This proves the uniqueness of the GNE, under
onditions of Theorem 9.
Remark 25 An alternative approah to establish the uniqueness of the solution of the Nash problem
(6) is to show that under a similar hypothesis, the funtion Φ(r) in (57) is a uniformly P-funtion on
the Cartesian produt set U . In turn, the latter an be proved by showing that the Jaobian matrix
JΦ(r) of the funtion Φ(r) is a partitioned P-matrix uniformly for all r ∈ U . We adopt the above
proof beause it an be used diretly in the onvergene analysis of the distributed algorithm to be
presented subsequently.
E Proof of Corollary 10.
To prove the desired suient onditions for B(R⋆) in (17) to be a P-matrix, we use the bounds (15)
in Corollary 6, as shown next.
We provide rst an upper bound of eah β̂qr(k), dened in (84). Let d , (dq)
Q
q=1 be dened as
d , (Zmax(R⋆))−1
(
eR
⋆
− 1
)
, (88)
with Zmax(R⋆) given in (13) and R⋆ = (R⋆q)
Q
q=1. By (15), we have
τ¯q(k) ≤ σ
2
q (k) +
(
max
r
′∈Ω
σ2
r
′ (k)
) ∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hrr(k)|
2dr, ∀k ∈ N , ∀q, r ∈ Ω, and q 6= r, (89)
where τ¯q(k) is dened in (61). Introduing (89) in (84), we obtain
β̂qr(k) ≤
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hrr(k)|
2
 σ2r (k)
σ2q (k)
+
(
max
r ′∈Ω
σ2r ′(k)
σ2q(k)
)∑
r ′ 6=q
∣∣Hqr ′(k)∣∣2
|Hr ′r ′(k)|
2 dr ′
 , ∀k ∈ N , ∀q, r ∈ Ω, and q 6= r.
(90)
Hene, realling the denitions of the onstants χ (assumed in (0, 1)) and ρ ≥ 1, as given in (19) and
28
(20), respetively, we dedue
max
k∈N
β̂qr(k) ≤
(
max
k∈N
|Hqr(k)|
2
|Hrr(k)|
2
)
·

(
max
k∈N
σ2r (k)
σ2q (k)
)
+
[
max
r ′∈Ω
(
max
k ∈N
σ2r ′(k)
σ2q(k)
)] ∑
r ′ 6=q
(
max
k∈N
∣∣Hqr ′(k)∣∣2
|Hr ′r ′(k)|
2
)
d̂r ′

≤ βmaxqr
{(
max
k∈N
σ2r(k)
σ2q(k)
)
+
[
max
r ′∈Ω
(
max
k∈N
σ2r ′(k)
σ2q (k)
)] (
ρ
χ
− 1
)}
, ∀q, r ∈ Ω, and q 6= r,
(91)
where βmaxqr is dened in (18).
From (91), one infers that ondition (23) implies that B(R⋆) in (17) is diagonally dominant, whih
is suient to guarantee the P-property of B(R⋆) [31, Theorem 6.2.3℄, and thus the uniqueness of the
GNE of (6) (Theorem 9).
It remains to show that (24) is equivalent to (23) if σ2q(k) = σ
2
r (k), ∀r, q ∈ Ω and k ∈ N . In this
ase, (23) redues to
ρ
∑
r 6=q
βmaxqr < χe
−2R⋆q , ∀ q ∈ Ω, (92)
or equivalently
ρmax
q ∈Ω
(eR⋆q − 1)∑
r 6=q
βmaxqr
 < χmax
q ∈Ω
( e−R
⋆
q − e−2R
⋆
q ), (93)
whih is learly equivalent to (24).
F Proof of Theorem 14 and Theorem 18
The proof of the onvergene of both the sequential and simultaneous IWFAs is similar to the proof of
the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G as given in Appendix D. The dierene is that instead of
working with two solutions of the GNEP (and showing that they are equal under ertain onditions),
we onsider the users' power alloation vetors produed by the algorithms in two onseutive iterations
and derive onditions under whih their respetive distanes to the unique solution of the game ontrat
under some norm.
We fous rst on the onvergene of the simultaneous IWFA. Then, we briey show that a similar
analysis an be arried out also for the sequential IWFA. Throughout the following analysis, we assume
that onditions of Theorem 9 are satised.
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F.1 Convergene of simultaneous IWFA
Let us dene p (n+1) , (p
(n+1)
q )
Q
q=1, with p
(n+1)
q , (p
(n+1)
q (k))Nk=1 denoting the power alloation vetor
of user q at iteration n+ 1 of the simultaneous IWFA given in Algorithm 1, and let
r(n+1)q (k) , log
(
1 +
|Hqq(k)|
2 p
(n+1)
q (k)
τ
(n)
q (k)
)
, k ∈ N , q ∈ Ω, n = 0, 1, . . . , (94)
with τ
(n)
q (k) , τq(k,p
(n)(k)), where p(n)(k) , (p
(n)
q (k))
Q
q=1 and τq(k,p
(n)(k)) is dened as in (60).
Aording to the simultaneous IWFA, at iteration n + 1, the power alloation p
(n+1)
q of eah user q
must satisfy the single-user waterlling solution (7) (see (30)), given the alloations p
(n)
−q , (p
(n)
r )Nr 6=q=1of
the other users at the previous iteration. It follows that eah p
(n+1)
q and r
(n+1)
q (k) satisfy (see (56))
0 ≤ r
(n+1)
q (k) ⊥ log(τ
(n)
q (k)) + r
(n+1)
q (k)− log(|Hqq(k)|
2) + ν
(n+1)
q ≥ 0, k ∈ N ,
ν
(n+1)
q free,
n∑
k=1
r
(n+1)
q (k) = R⋆q ,
∀n = 0, 1, . . . ,
(95)
or equivalently (see (63)), for all q ∈ Ω and n = 0, 1, . . . ,
N∑
k=1
(
rq(k)− r
(n+1)
q (k)
) (
− log(|Hqq(k)|
2) + log(τ (n)q (k)) + r
(n+1)
q (k)
)
≥ 0, ∀rq ∈ Uq, (96)
where Uq is dened in (58). Let p
⋆ , (p⋆q)
Q
q=1 denote the unique GNE of the game G (i.e.,the unique
solution of (32)) and r⋆ , (r⋆q)
Q
q=1 the unique rate solution of (55). Note that eah r
⋆
q satises the
onstraints in (96). Hene, following the same approah as in Appendix D to obtain (67) from (63), we
dedue ∥∥∥r(n+1)q − r⋆q ∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥ log(τ (n)q )− log(τ ⋆q)∥∥∥
2
, ∀q ∈ Ω, ∀n = 0, 1, . . . , (97)
where τ ⋆q , (τ
⋆
q (k))
N
k=1 and τ
⋆
q (k) , τq(k,p
⋆(k)). Similarly to (69), there exists some salar s
(n)
q (k) suh
that
|Hqq(k)|
2p
(n+1)
q (k)
τ
(n)
q (k)
≤ s(n)q (k) ≤
|Hqq(k)|
2p⋆q(k)
τ⋆q (k)
, (98)
and, for all k ∈ N , q ∈ Ω, and n = 0, 1, . . . ,
r
(n+1)
q (k)− r⋆q(k) =
( p (n+1)q (k)− p∗q(k))+ p (n+1)q (k)
τ
(n)
q (k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2
(
p
(n+1)
r (k) − p⋆r(k)
)
·
|Hqq(k)|
2
τ⋆q (k)( 1 + s
(n)
q (k) )
.
(99)
Moreover, there exists some salar ω
(n)
q (k) suh that
τ (n)q (k) ≤ ω
(n)
q (k) ≤ τ
⋆
q (k), (100)
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and, for all k ∈ N , q ∈ Ω, n = 0, 1, . . . ,
log(τ (n)q (k)) − log(τ
∗
q (k)) =
1
ω
(n)
q (k)
(
τ (n)q (k)− τ
∗
q (k)
)
=
1
ω
(n)
q (k)
∑
r 6=q
|Hqr(k)|
2
(
p(n)r (k)− p
∗
r(k)
)
.
(101)
Introduing the vetor t(n) , (t
(n)
q )
Q
q=1, with t
(n)
q dened as
t(n)q ,
√√√√√ N∑
k=1
 |Hqq(k)|2
(
p
(n)
q (k)− p∗q(k)
)
τ¯q(k)
2, q ∈ Ω, n = 0, 1, . . . ., (102)
with τ¯q(k) given in (61) and using (99) and (101), (97) leads to
(Diag {B(R⋆)}) t(n+1) ≤ (o-Diag {B(R⋆)}) t(n), n = 0, 1, . . . ., (103)
where Diag {B(R⋆)} and o-Diag {B(R⋆)} are the diagonal and the o-diagonal parts of B(R⋆), re-
spetively, with B(R⋆) dened in (85). Based on (103), the proof of onvergene of the simultaneous
IWFA is guaranteed under onditions on Theorem 9, as argued next.
Aording to [32, Lemma 5.3.14℄, the P-property ofB(R⋆), with B(R⋆) dened in (17), is equivalent
to the spetral ondition:
ρ
[
(Diag {B(R⋆)})−1o-Diag {B(R⋆)}
]
< 1, (104)
where ρ(A) denotes the spetral radius of A. Therefore, by (103) and (104), the sequene {t(n)}
ontrats under a ertain matrix norm; hene it onverges to zero. The laimed onvergene of the
sequene {p(n)} follows readily.
F.2 Convergene of sequential IWFA
The onvergene of the sequential IWFA desribed in Algorithm 2 an be studied using the same
approah as for the simultaneous IWFA. The dierene is the nal relationship between the error vetors
in two onseutive iterations of the algorithm. More speially, using the vetors t(n) , (t
(n)
q )
Q
q=1, with
t
(n)
q dened as in (102), one an see that the sequential IWFA leads to
(Diag {B(R⋆)} − Low {B(R⋆)}) t(n+1) ≤ (Up {B(R⋆)}) t(n), n = 0, 1, . . . ., (105)
where Low {B(R⋆)} and Up {B(R⋆)} denotes the stritly lower and stritly upper triangular parts of
B(R⋆), respetively. The above inequality implies
t(n+1) ≤ (Diag {B(R⋆)} − Low {B(R⋆)} )−1 (Up {B(R⋆)} ) t(n) = Υt(n), n = 0, 1, . . . ., (106)
where
Υ , (Diag {B(R⋆)} − Low {B(R⋆)} )−1 Up {B(R⋆)} . (107)
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In (105) we used the fat that, under the P-property of the Z-matrix Diag {B(R⋆)}−Low {B(R⋆)} (due
to the fat that all its prinipal minors are less than one), the inverse (Diag {B(R⋆)} − Low {B(R⋆)} )−1
is well-dened and nonnegative entry-wise [32, Theorem 3.11.10℄.
Aording to (106), the onvergene of the sequential IWFA is guaranteed under the spetral on-
dition
ρ (Υ)< 1, (108)
whih is equivalent to the P-property of B(R⋆) [32, Lemma 5.3.14℄, with B(R⋆) dened in (17).
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Figure 1: Probability of existene (red line urves) and uniqueness (blue line urves) of the GNE versus d
[subplot (b)℄ for a 7-ell (downlink) ellular system [subplot (a)℄ and rate proles R⋆
q
= 1 bit/symb/subhannel
(square markers) and R⋆
q
= 2 bit/symb/subhannel (ross markers), ∀q ∈ Ω.
35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
iterations (n)
R
at
es
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
iterations (n)
R
at
es
(b)
Figure 2: Rates of the users versus iterations: sequential IWFA (solid line urves), simultaneous IWFA (dashed
line urves), Q = 10, drq/dqr, drr = dqq = 1, γ = 2.5.
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